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Habeas Corpus- A Protean Writ and Remedy*
GEORGE F. LONGSDORFt
"The Story of Habeas Corpus" is one of the evolution from
obscurity of the great writ for the protection of the inalienable
liberty of man. It has already been told in part.'
Essential in understanding of the modern writ of habeas corpus,
now appropriated to the great writ ad subjudiciendum is a study of
the history of the various writs of habeas corpus, and of the
changes that have occurred by which the great writ continues in
vigor, while all of the other writs of habeas corpus have fallen
into rare use or complete disuse and their names become almost
obsolete. Their names remain in the books, but "habeas corpus"
standing alone today almost invariably means the great writ. The
objects and functions of the other writs, the auxiliary and proces-
sive writs of habeas corpus remain, but are accomplished by mod-
ern, if not always simpler, forms of procedure and under other
names.
No one knows the origin of the various writs of habeas corpus,
or the first procedures applicable to them, either of the great writ
or of the other writs; or how much one may be older than another.
Scholars of earlier centuries who wrote about these writs did not,
if they knew, record the geneses of the writs or of the remedy
which we call the great writ.
The early writers tell us meagrely of the appropriate procedures
and somewhat less than generously of the changes which occurred
in method, objects, and reach of the various writs. Mr. Jenks says:
"This perhaps is the most embarrassing discovery, the more
one studies the ancient writs of habeas corpus (for there were
many varieties of the article) the more clear grows the conviction
* Reprinted, with permission of the author and of The West Publishing
Company, from 8 Federal Rules Decisions 173, copyright, 1948, by The West
Publishing Company. Citations in the original version have been made footnotes
herein, in accordance with Ohio State Law Journal format.
f Librarian, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit; Author of
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, Original Edition; Member of Advisory Com-
mittee of Supreme Court on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; Consultant
on Revision of Title 18, United States Code.
'The Story of Habeas Corpus is the title of an essay by Edward Jenks in
18 QuARTERLY L. REv. 64 et seq. (1902). He says: "There is no readily accessi-
ble book ... , which gives in a succinct and intelligible form, an account of
this famous bulwark of our liberties." His story cannot be bettered, but it does
not reach American, and especially federal, laws and practices. It is not ac-
cessible in most law libraries, and this is but an attempt to sketch and supple-
ment it.
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that, whatever may have been its ultimate use, the writ Habeas
Corpus was originally intended not to get people out of prison, but
to put them in it." (Italics his.)
In Matter of Jackson,2 Judge Cooley says that "the writ is so
ancient that its origin is lost in obscurity;" and that the Habeas
Corpus Act of 31 Car. II "introduced no new principle. ' 3 Hallam,4
speaking only about habeas corpus ad subjudiciendum under 31
Car. II, c. 2, wrote: "It is a very common mistake . . . to suppose
that this statute of Charles II enlarged in a great degree our
liberties, and forms a sort of epoch in our history." That act ap-
plied only when one was imprisoned on a charge of crime. Hallam
continues that "it was always in his power to demand of the court
of King's Bench a writ of habeas corpus ad subjudiciendum." It
was doubted whether the Common Pleas could allow that writ, or
whether a single judge of the King's Bench could do so. The Act
removed some doubts and effected other improvements in the
remedy. A doubt whether the Common Pleas could issue habeas
corpus (ad faciendum?) to bring up a prisoner to be admitted to
bail on a misdemeanor charge was resolved by issuance of the writ
for that purpose, in Jones's Case,5 the argument have been that
only the King's Bench had such authority in a criminal case; but
Jones's Case" was one of a writ in his favor to admit him to bail,
not one to discharge him from illegal imprisonment, although that
approached or foreshadowed use of habeas corpus ad subjudi-
ciendum in favor of liberty.
It may be inferred that the great writ is more recent in origin
than the other auxiliary and processive writs; or, if not younger,
that it was infrequently used prior to 31 Car. II (1679) while they
had been often used. Certainly, if the right to the great writ had
been well established, had been procedurally efficient, and had been
in common use, there would have been little occasion for 16 Car. I
c. 10 (1640) which in turn proved dilatory and abortive. The
cause and occasion for 31 Car. II, c. 2 (1679) was the futility of
16 Car. I, c. 10, along with other incentives. Those acts sought to
make effective for all men in prison, and in need of relief, the
great writ. There is abundant historical reason to believe that
during the times of the Tudor and the Stuart kings the great writ
was not in common or frequent use. Any ordinary person in prison
2 15 Mich. 417, 436 (1867).
8 Citing HALLAM, CONST. HIST., ch. 13; Beeching's Case, 4 B. & C. 136, in
which case the King's Bench issued habeas corpus on common law principles,
although the case was not criminal within the meaning of 31 Car. II, c. 2, nor
open to habeas corpus under that statute.
'HALLAM, CONST. HIsT., 617 et seq.
'2 Mod. 198, about 1654 before 31 Car. II, c. 2.
'Jones's Case, supra.
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in their days would have had little hope of obtaining the great writ
or liberty thereby.
We do know that there have been many procedural changes and
adaptations of writs of habeas corpus for use as process in pending
cases. The varying kinds of the writ and their emergence in re-
ports at different times show this. We do know that Magna Carta
guaranteed men against imprisonment contrary to the law of the
land or, as we say, without due process of law. We know-it is a
maxim-that this right of liberty must have had a remedy, and,
if none was known, one must have been invented after 1215; and
that one was invented before 1640 or 1679. The Statutes of 16
Car. I and 31 Car. II may not be construed as inventions of what
they professed to confirm and protect. The great writ must have
been contrived in that interim. Hallam7 narrates that in the case
of a freeman detained in prison on a criminal charge "it was al-
ways," that is before 1679, in his power to demand of the King's
Bench a writ of habeas corpus ad subjudiciendum, directed to the
prison having custody and commanding the keeper to bring up the
prisoner with the warrant of commitment, "that the court might
judge of its sufficiency, and remand the party, admit him to bail,
or discharge him, according to the nature of the charge." A very
little stretch was necessary to make out of this a remedy where,
after an illegal or fatally invalid conviction and sentence, the
prisoner had been committed for punishment. One Jenkes (not
Edward Jenks) had sought this remedy in the Quarter Sessions,
and had been relegated to the King's Bench which procrastinated
and defeated his writ in 1676. Earlier but after 1640 several bills
to make more secure the right to habeas corpus had failed in
Parliament. Hallam thinks that Jenkes' frustration was not the
main producing cause of the Act of 1679. One case is reported of
habeas corpus in the Common Pleas in favor of a prisoner in jail
on a misdemeanor charge to bring him in and admit him to bail.
It was objected that in a criminal case only the King's Bench could
afford that relief, but that was overruled on the ground that mis-
demeanor was not a criminal case in this sense; and the Common
Pleas granted the writ.8 Of course this was not a habeas corpus
ad subjudiciendum in the modern sense in relief of a prisoner in-
validly convicted and in prison under sentence.
The protean traits of these various writs became more marked
when habeas corpus came to America and became part of the com-
mon and statute laws of the several states and of the United States.
They took it as a heritage of law and to some extent made it statu-
"See note 3, supra.
'Jones's Case, 2 Mod. 198, 28 & 29 Car. II, about 1654 (14 years after the
Act of 1640 and 15 years before the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
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tory and constitutional. The United States recognized it as in-
herited common law by the Constitution, and Congress gave it into
the powers of the courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789. 9 Numerous
changes occurred by reason of the dual federal and state sovereignty
and by reason of the greatly altered structure of the courts from
that of the English courts. It would be impossible except in the
space of a copious book to go into state laws and changes upon the
subject. What is hereafter written pertains primarily to federal
habeas corpus.
The judicial power of the United States clearly comprehends
habeas corpus, 10 and the courts and judges empowered to allow or
grant the writ were designated in the Judiciary Act of 1789 Section
14; but the procedure was left to be adapted and evolved from the
common law. Power to "grant" the writ of habeas corpus "for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment," the great
writ ad subjudiciendum, was given to "justices of the Supreme
Court, as well as judges of the district courts." The power was not
split up among courts, as it had been in England. The power to
"issue" writs of habeas corpus "necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions" was given to all the federal courts then
established (but not to their judges), namely to the district courts,
circuit courts, and Supreme Court. The circuit courts then con-
sisted of the district judge of the district and any two justices of
the Supreme Court convoked to sit in the several districts. Not
until 1869 were there any "circuit judges." Those judgeships were
then created,:" and the circuit judges were given the powers and
jurisdiction of a circuit justice allotted to the circuit.
These statutes passed into United States Revised Statutes of
1873, Section 751, giving all the courts power to issue writs of
habeas corpus; Section 752, giving the "justices and judges of said
courts the power to grant the great writ"; and Section 716, giving
all courts power to issue writs necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, omitting to name habeas corpus but includ-
ing it by necessary implication. Sections 751 and 752 have become
28 United States Code, Sections 451 and 452 (1946) ; and Section
716 became 28 United States Code, Section 377 (1946).
THE NAME "HABEAS CORPUS"-SIGNIFICANCE AND CHANGES
This name without its descriptive additions has come into cus-
tomary use, which caused some obscurity and confusion until re-
cent times when the minor writs, auxiliary and processive in the
exercise of jurisdiction, had passed out of general use. The Eng-
'ART. I, §9; 1 STAT. 81 §14 (1789).
" Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93 (U.S. 1807) (Per Marshall, C. J.).
u16 STAT. 44 (1869).
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lish were more careful about this, usually speaking of the writ
ad subjudiciendum as "the great writ" and giving the others their
proper descriptive additions.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 Section 14 used the words "writs of
habeas corpus" to name both the great writ and the other auxiliary
and processive writs; the distinctions were implied from the context
of the statute describing the purposes of the writs, and also from the
provision that only justices or district judges were empowered
to grant the great writ, while courts were empowered to issue the
other writs. It became necessary to explain these differing conno-
tations by adding to each writ and the words "habeas corpus" its
descriptive characteristics, which Chief Justice Marshall did in
Ex parte Bollman. 2 Section 14 of Judiciary Act of 1789 was not
changed in this respect until 1873, when the laws were revised into
United States Revised Statutes, Sections 751 et seq., transferring
to Section 716 what had been the first sentence of Section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, but omitting the words "habeas corpus."
Section 716 is now 28 United States Code, Section 377 (1946).
Section 753, United States Revised Statutes, otherwise relating
wholly to the great writ ad subjudiciendum and limiting its use
in federal courts to prisoners in jail or custody, added an excep-
tion "unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to
testify." The exception is redundant because United States Re-
vised Statutes Section 716, 28 United States Code Section 377
(1946), without naming habeas corpus includes it when necessary
to the exercise of jurisdiction ;13 also because upon the great writ
the statute elsewhere requires production of the body of the pris-
oner in the court by the respondent on return to and hearing upon
the writ.14
The earliest appearance of the name "habeas corpus" as re-
vealed in accessible books was about 700 years ago. Bracton, who
died in 1268, wrote of it as one of the successive writs to compel
a defendant to appear and attend an action in personam. Pollock
& MVlaitland5 cite this but add in a footnote that this use of habeas
corpus disappeared and was supplanted by distress; and such
habeas corpus did not provide for taking and keeping the defend-
ant to answer, but only for arresting him and bringing him into
court on or near court day. Whether Bracton chose to name this
writ from two of the Latin words contained in it, or whether some
other person applied that name is anybody's guess. It certainly
4 Cranch 75, 97 (U.S. 1807) (Quoting 3 BL. Comm. 129 et seq.).
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948); Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132,
136 (1905).
"1 REv. STAT. §758 (1878), now 28 U.S.C. §458 (1948) ; Holiday v. Johnston,
313 U.S. 342, 350 (1940).
"2 POLLOCK & AITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 593 (1911).
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was an old name of known and various significance for writs of
differing characteristics long before the Statute of 16 Car. I, c. 10
(1640) and the English Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. II, c. 2
(1679). The name was not devised for the great writ; an existing
name was appropriated to it.
The two words "habeas corpus" have been called the "signif-
icant" words which gave name to the writ and remedy of habeas
corpus. The objection to that is that a name should be more than
merely significant of the object; it should be characteristic and
distinctive unless it can mean only one thing. The characteristic
words ad prosequendum, ad testificndum, etc., have been added
by careful writers and judges, especially in England; but, as was
stated in a preceding paragraph, American usage has been lax in
this respect. And now by reason of the practical disuse of most
or all of the auxiliary and processive writs of habeas corpus, it
has come to pass that "habeas corpus" means the great writ which
alone survives; but the old books must not be read in that way.
The great writ is characteristically different in object from all the
others; and surviving alone may take the name to itself without
much risk of confusion. The other writs have been metamorphosed
into motions and orders, or the like, bearing new names while
seeking the same objects.
The word "writ" is a vestige of the times in England when all
actions on the law side by private persons, or on their behalf, must
have been begun only after leave had from the King, or in his
name from the Lord Chancellor. This formality fell into the issu-
ance of the writs as a matter of course, and thence in the practice
of reciting in the declaration that a writ had been granted. In
high prerogative actions, such as mandamus or quo warranto, they
continued to originate by writ. Writs of habeas corpus, the great
writ, could be granted under 31 Car. II, c. 2, only by the King's
Bench (or perhaps by the Lord Chancellor) and only in criminal
cases, and only upon application and a showing of probable cause
and necessity.1 By later statutes power to grant it was extended
to other judges, and in modern English practice it is a writ of right
but does not issue as of course. 17
This invited the dictum that the great writ is "a high preroga-
tive writ." Jenks says that it is not, that it is "but a merely inter-
locutory mandate or precept in the course of other procedures."' 8
Chief Justice Marshall called it "a high prerogative writ, known
to the common law."' 19 Halsbury, Laws of England,20 calls it that
103 BL. COMM. 132.
17 10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (1909).
The Story of Habeas Corpus, cited Note 1, supra.
"Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (U.S. 1830).
210 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 39 (1909).
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and cites Lord Mansfield, who did not say exactly that. Mr. Jenks,
who spoke last except Halsbury must be in the right, because
Halsbury2 ' says it is a writ of right but not a writ of course. If
it be a writ of right to men, it is not a prerogative of the King;
and in the United States there can be no prerogative writs, except
by nick-name. Besides, habeas corpus is a privilege which not
even Congress or the President may suspend except as and when
the Constitution permits.2 2
THE GREAT WRIT AND THE AuxILIARY OR PROCESSIVE
WRITS-PURPOSES
While all this was going on in England, and probably long
before the emergence of the great writ, various auxiliary and pro-
cessive writs of habeas corpus were devised and originated, the
objects of which were not for relief of the prisoner from durance.
Some of them were civil processes to bring persons into court who
were not imprisoned or detained. By changes and improvements
in procedure most of these auxiliary writs have fallen into disuse,
their objects being accomplished through simpler procedure. Their
functions, so far as needed, remain but their names are lost. With
few exceptions they have been superseded in England by other
process and procedure to effect their purposes..2 3
Mr. Jenks says 24 that the great writ originated not in vague
assertions of the right of liberty, but in the practice of arrest on
mesne process. As a fact in legal history the processes of arrest
on mesne process, and of execution against the body of defendant,
grew up in lieu of capias with civil bail or release upon under-
taking. The capias and arrest, now superseded, was in its time
a supersedure of the habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum. The early
habeas corpus suggested by Bracton in the 13th century to bring
a defendant into court to answer a declaration in personam was
superseded by distress. 25 The general abolition of imprisonment
for debt would have made these writs and procedure obsolete, even
if the structures of American courts admitted of the use of habeas
corpus to bring one under civil arrest into another court for
execution.
In order to identify the auxiliary and processive writs of ha-
beas corpus, now obsolute or nearly so, it is fitting to name and
describe them. Chief Jusice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman28 states
10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (1909).
U. S. CONST. ART. I §9; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866).
HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 39 n. (d) (1909).
' The Story of Habeas Corpus, cited note 1, supra.
2See 2 PoLOcx & MAITLAND, HisToRy OF ENGLISH LAw 593 (1911).
'4 Cranch 75, 97 (U.S. 1807).
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that they are stated and described accurately in 3 Blackstone's
Commentaries 129, as follows:
Habeas corpus ad respondendum to take a man confined by
Process of an inferior court to charge him in the court above.
[That is now accomplished in some courts, when needed, by an
order transferring the case and is not always limited to prosecu-
tions where the prisoner is confined under process. See various
state criminal laws.]
Habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum to bring a prisoner charged
in judgment into a higher court to charge him by execution.
[Marshall says: "This case can never occur in the courts of the
United States. One court never awards execution on the judgment
of another. Our whole judicial system forbids it."]
Habeas corpus ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliber-
andum, etc., to bring a prisoner into court that he may
prosecute or testify therein or be tried therein.
[Ad prosequendum to bring a prisoner into the proper court to
be tried appears to have been the writ actually used in Virginia v.
Pau27 to bring a prisoner indicted in a state court for removal
into a Federal court for trial; but the proper writ for that pur-
pose was held to be habeas corpus ad faciendum, etc., cum causa,
under United States Revised Statutes, Section 643, 28 United
States Code, Section 76 (1946) and not a writ under United States
Revised Statutes, Section 753, 28 United States Code, Section 453
(1946). Ad testificandum is preserved by 28 United States Code,
Section 453, last clause, although 28 United States Code, Section
377 seems to have been a better place for it; unless its use to bring
a state prisoner into a federal court to testify was designed to
be covered. Any use of it must be rare. In Ex parte Dorr,2 it is
said that no Federal court or judge can bring a prisoner from
custody under a state court's sentence "for any other purpose than
to be used as a witness." The Removal Acts2 9 as regards this
process were based on 4 Statutes at Large 633 (1833), which was
in effect when Ex parte Dorr, supra, was decided in 1845; hence
the language in the opinion is too broad. In spite of the Dorr
dictum it must be doubted whether a state prisoner can be brought
to testify in a federal court except in a very necessitous case, if
at all. A deposition would meet most cases.]
Habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum, otherwise ha-
beas corpus cum causa to remove the action against the
person detained in an inferior (or other) court into a higher
or proper court for trial.
[This was formerly used to bring a prisoner from a federal dis-
'148 U.S. 107 (1892).
3 How. 103, 105 (U.S. 1845).
RL. STAT. §643 (1878).
[Vol. 10
A PROTEAN WRIT
trict in which he was arrested into the proper district for trial,
but that is now superseded by Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 40 (b) (3). The same writ is authorized by 28 United
States Code, Section 75 (1946),30 when procedure for removal of
certain state criminal cases is complete, to bring the prisoner to
the Federal court for trial.]
Habeas corpora juratorum was a writ to bring the jurors
into court in the English Common Pleas.
[A venire facias under 28 United States Code, Section 416 (1946)
is used in federal courts to summon jurors.]
A few other auxiliary or processive writs of habeas corpus were
used before Blackstone's time, but they need not be pursued here.
Although the distinctions between habeas corpus ad subjudi-
cieizdum (an original writ and remedy) and the auxiliary and pro-
cessive writs of habeas corpus were well recognized in England;
the 14th section of the Judiciary Act of 178931 in its first sentence
empowered "all" the "courts" of the United States "to issue writs
of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs, not especially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise
of their respective jurisdictions." [Italics supplied.] The second
sentence provided that "either of the justices of the Supreme Court,
as well as the judges of the district courts, shall have the power
to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of inquiry into
the cause of commitinent." This embodiment in one section of two
different kinds of habeas corpus invited confusion which appeared
eighteen years later in Ex parte Bollman 2 Counsel argued at
length that the Supreme Court had power to issue the writ ad
subjudiciendum under the first sentence of Section 14 to liberate
Bollman held for trial for treason, although the trial was not one
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred
by Article III of the Constitution. The argument ran that the first
sentence was a general grant of power unlimited to the necessities
of any particular jurisdiction. Chief Jusice Marshall rejected that
argument pointing out that the two classes of habeas corpus are
distinct, the first class in the first sentence being accessory to some
jurisdiction invoked in the issuing court, and the second class be-
ing an original writ grantable by justices or judges to institute
inquiry into the lawfulness of the commitment of the petitioner.
The writ was accordingly granted under the power given by the
second sentence of Section 14 and all common law jurisdiction over
the prosecution in the Supreme Court was expressly disclaimed.33
On return to the writ the petitioner was discharged because his
E;Rv. STAT. §642 (1878).
I STAT. 81 (1789).
=4 Cranch 75 (U.S. 1807).
'Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93-100 (U.S. 1807).
1949]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
commitment for trial, whereby he was detained, was based on
affidavits which showed that no such crime had been committed. 34
This decision established in the federal courts the distinctions and
differences in the two classes of habeas corpus.
In 1912 the first sentence of Section 14 of Judiciary Act of
1789, had been transferred into United States Revised Statutes,
Section 716, and then became Judicial Code Section 262, which in
turn became United States Code, Section 377. All of these omitted
the words "habeas corpus," contained in the first sentence of Sec-
tion 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789; but it remained within the
meaning of 28 United States Code, Section 377, as was determined
in Whitney v. Dick ;35 Price v. Johnston." The latest case again
distinguishes the two classes of habeas corpus, but recognizes that
habeas corpus of the first class remains available, if needed for the
exercise of jurisdiction.
CHANGES MADE BY THE SHOW-CAUSE PROCEDURE
The development of the procedure upon an application for the
great writ by ordering the respondent to show cause why the writ
should not issue made a great change in habeas corpus procedure,
and even some in the hearing on the writ and return when it was
allowed and had issued.
Today when one speaks of habeas corpus, it is fairly safe to
assume that he is speaking of the great writ ad subjudiciendum;
but it is not at all safe to assume that he is speaking f that
writ allowed, issued, and in operation. He may be speaking of a
protean change of procedure by which a preliminary inquiry is
made by a show-cause order, the answer thereto (often called a
"return"), and the hearing to determine whether the applicant is
entitled to the writ. If that is decided in his favor the writ then
issues and the case goes on to a hearing on the writ; if against
his application, the writ may be denied, probably in some instances
without prejudice to a new application or to amendment.
The show-cause proceeding is not ancient. Its propriety was
recognized in Ex parte Watkins, 37 in 1830; again in Ex parte
Milligan,38 Ex parte Yarbrough,39 and Ex parte Collins.40 The
show-cause proceeding is one to obtain the writ, for it but not
upon it; though it may decide some or all of the questions which
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 136 (U.S. 1807).
-202 U.S. 132, 136 (1905).
-334 U.S. 266 (1948).
-3 Pet. 193, 196 (U.S. 1830).
"4 Wall. 2, 110 (U.S. 1866).
110 U.S. 651 (1883).
' 154 Fed. 980, (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1907), 'ffd 214 U.S. 113 (1908).
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could have been made upon the writ and return. It is adapted to
frame preliminary issues of law and fact like a dilatory plea or
demurrer. The show-cause proceeding and the proceeding on the
writ itself are not the same, although both or either may be called
a "habeas corpus proceeding" (are so-called in 28 United States
Code, Section 463), and though the same question might have been
decided in either. Even Proteus could not have excelled that
metamorphosis. In fact there is one leading case wherein all the
issues were fully tried in the show-cause proceeding, whereupon
the parties stipulated that the answer to the show-cause proceed-
ing and a traverse of that answer should stand as a return to the
writ, and that the traverse of the answer should stand as a traverse
of a return to the writ, whereupon the writ issued and judgment
was given.41 That might have caused a lifting of eyebrows in the
King's Bench two centuries earlier. To have determined the merits
of the wrif upon an application for it was an innovation, possibly
a risky one; but it worked.
The show-cause procedure is in use in England. For about a
century it has been usual to grant a rule nisi on an application
for a writ in the first instance; and only in urgent cases to grant
a rule absolute for issuance of the writ.42
Since 1867 it has been provided by statute that upon applica-
tion the writ shall issue "forthwith . . . , unless it appears from
the petition itself that the party is not entitled thereto."4 That
was 37 years after Ex parte Watkins,"4 the use of a show-cause
order was sanctioned. If the word "forthwith" had been intended
to deprive the judge of any discretion to withhold the writ except
when the application was on its face self-defeating-an unreason-
able construction-that construction was not given in later de-
cisions. 4 5 Had there been any question that discretion is left to
resort to a show-cause proceeding, it is removed by the recently
enacted Revised Judicial Code and Judiciary Title, 28 United States
Code, Section 2243, which authorizes either the award of the writ
or a show-cause order "unless it appears from the application that
the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto."
A consummate statement of the procedure open to the judge
who entertains an application for habeas corpus, and of the alterna-
'Ex" parte Duncan, 146 F. 2d 576, 577 (9th Cir. 1944), Rev'd on Merits But
Not on Procedure 327 U.S. 304 (1945).
10 HALsBURY, LAwS OF ENGLAND 60 (1909), citing Eggington's Case,
2 E. & B. 717, 734 (1853).
4214 STAT. 385 (1869); REv. STAT. §755 (1878), 28 U.S.C. §455 (1946).
"3 Pet. 193, 196 (U.S. 1830).
'
2 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) [on authority of Ex parte Watkins,
3 Pet. 193, 201 (U.S. 1830); Ex parte Collins, 154 Fed. 980 (C.C. N.D. Cal.
1907), aff'd, 214 U.S. 213 (1909).
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tives of action thereon, is given in Dorsej v. Gill,46 opinion by
Justice Miller of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
He enumerates ten possible alternatives, describing each, from
which the judge must choose with appropriate discretion. The one
which the district judge chose was to deny the writ, and the Court
of Appeals sustained him by dismissing the appeal.
Earlier cases did not very explicitly describe the procedure on
a show-cause order, leaving it to be educed from reported de-
cisions ;47 but in Ex parte Collins, 48 an order to show cause was
made, "return" or answer was made, and objection to that pro-
cedure was made below, but upon appeal the procedure was ap-
proved. It has now become statutory.4 9
CHANGES MADE BY FIRST EIGHT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The Fifth Amendment guarantees to every person that he shall
not be deprived of liberty "without due process of law," and the
Fourteenth that "no State" shall so deprive him. They hark back
to Magna Carta which contained the equivalent words, "the law
of the land." The great writ was devised in England to effectuate
this guarantee. It was a remedy against illegal imprisonment by
departure from due process of 'law. Neither these two amendments
nor the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 nor the federal habeas
corpus acts have essayed to define and catalogue those departures
from due process which will support a grant of the writ. That in
recent times the concept of due process in criminal prosecutions
has been liberalized and enlarged may not be denied; but in plain
thought that did not change the character, scope, or reach of the
great writ; it merely increased the occasions for it. The procedure
to obtain the writ and the procedure upon it were not affected
by the Amendments. If there was any change it was in the inter-
pretations of "due process of law," and in regarding as departures
therefrom some actions or omissions in prosecutions previously
regarded as errors corrigible by appeal or writ of error or new
trial, but not by collateral attack by habeas corpus' 0
CHANGES MADE BY PROVISIONS FOR APPEALS
A right of appeal or a right to a writ of error to the refusal to
grant the writ of habeas corpus, or to the grant of it, or to the
- 148 F. 2d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (before the late revision).
" See Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 196 (U.S. 1830) [referring to Ex parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U.S. 1822)].
154 Fed. 980, 982 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1907).
"Revised 28 U.S.C. §2243 (1948).
60 The federal decisions upon the grounds which will support such collateral
attack are collated in Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus, 23 WASH.
L. RLv. 87 (1948).
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judgment upon hearing upon the writ and return, exists only by
virtue of statute. In ordinary actions a writ of error would not
lie to an interlocutory order, and the grant or denial of the writ is
interlocutory in form. Consequently the refusal or grant of the
originating writ of habeas corpus was irreviewable; and for the
same reason the issuance of any of the auxiliary and processive
writs of habeas corpus-incidents in the course of a case-were
irreviewable at common law.
In the federal courts no appellate review of habeas corpus
proceedings was provided for by the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
writs of error or appeals allowed by that Act were limited to cases
capable of a money valuation.s1 Habeas corpus cases resulted in
no such reviewable judgment.5 2 In 1866 the famous case of Ex
parte Milliganf3 was heard in the Supreme Court upon a certifica-
tion of questions upon division of opinions in the circuit court,
made under Act of April 29, 1802, Section 6.4 The certified ques-
tions were accepted under that Act, which was held to be applica-
ble to habeas corpus proceedings.55 This was the nearest approach
to a review at that time.
A right of appeal was first given in federal courts by the Act
of 1867,0 which passed into United States Revised Statutes, Sec-
tion 763 and that with amendments into 28 United States Code,
Sections 463, 464. This appeal was and is peculiar in that it laid
to a "final decision . . . upon an application for a writ of habeas
corpus or upon such writ when issued," as enacted is 1873 and to
"the final order" made "in a proceeding in habeas corpus in a dis-
trict court" under 28 United States Code, Section 463 (a). In
Revised Title 28, United States Code, Section 2253, the words "dis-
trict court" have been changed to read "circuit or district judge"
with a result that none may safely predict.5 7 "All final decisions"
by district courts, including of course those in habeas corpus cases
when heard on the writ and return, are appealable to the proper
t
'See 1 STAT. 84 §22 (1789).
'Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black 271, 272 (U.S. 1861); Barry v. Mercein, 5
How. 103, 119 (U.S. 1847).
4 Wall. 2, 4, 108 (U.S. 1866).
"2 STAT. 159 (1802).
4 Wall. 109 (U.S. 1866).
014 STAT. 386 §1 (1867).
' A circuit judge may grant the writ or, impliedly refuse it, but his order
must be "entered in the records of the district court;" or he may "decline to
entertain" the application for the writ and transfer it to the district court
(Revised 28 U.S.C. §2241 [a,b]). The question at once arises whether a cir-
cuit judge entertaining the application and making a show-cause order, or
otherwise having a hearing, is acting as a district judge or as the district court.
If he acts as a circuit judge, the appeal would go to his own court or appeals
where he would be disqualified.
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Court of Appeals, save those appealable directly to the Supreme
Court.5 8 The great change effected by creation of a right of appeal
in these terms was to elevate the issuance or refusal of the writ
into a proceeding and order having finality for purpose of review;
and the appellate judgment is also a change in that by reversal
the proceeding may go back to the district court for further pro-
cedure, or by affirmance for further procedure. At common law
nothing remained but the right to apply again.
It is conjecturable, if not provable, that the evolution of the
show-cause procedure under way from 1830 to 1867 may have been
an inducing cause for the creation of a right of appeal in the Act
of 1867 to include decisions preliminary to judgment upon hearing
of the issued writ and return to it. If the Act had not given the
right, a decision upon application denying the writ would have
remained irreviewable, however grave and final its consequences.
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ATTACK AND CHANGES THEREIN
The doctrine of res judicata has not been applied to its full
and conventional extent in habeas corpus in the federal courts.
The doctrine of collateral attack is involved only in the scope and
reach of habeas corpus to invalidate judgments in a prosecution
for crime with sentence to imprisonment, or to invalidate other
proceedings detaining a prisoner for trial for crime, or nonjudicial
proceedings detaining him for other reasons, such as for deporta-
tion as an alien. Essentially habeas corpus is a collateral attack on
the proceeding or process of detention.59
A judgment in habeas corpus discharging the prisoner upon a
hearing upon facts and law and upon the writ and return thereto
is conclusive of his right to remain at liberty,60 even if he had been
held under a state detention or sentence.6 1 If, however, his deten-
tion was merely preliminary to trial, his discharge is conclusive
only as to the grounds determined. 2 And when the order dis-
charging him is reversed on appeal by respondent, the Government
may retake him or further detain him, if there be further cause
for so doing.6 3 Generally, a denial of the writ, or a remand on
hearing on the writ and return, of the prisoner to the custody of
respondent is not a bar to successive applications for the writ.
That has been the law hitherto. The doctrine of res judicata did
028 U.S.C. §225 (a) (1946), now revised 28 U.S.C. §129 (1948).
OSee Peters, Collateral Attack By Habeas Corpus, 23 WAsH L. REv. 87
(1948).
'Morse v. United States, 267 U.S. 80 (1924).
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889) [affirming 39 Fed. 833 (1889)].
'Morse v. United States, supra, note 59.
'Haddox v. Richardson, 168 Fed. 635, 641 (4th Cir. 1909).
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not apply to bar successive applications in such a situation.6 4
As this is written the Revised Title 28, United States Code, has
become law. It contains a new habeas corpus act which makes
great changes. The application is required to be more specific and
may be amended or supplemented (Section 2242) ; show-cause order
is sanctioned by statute (Section 2243), and successive writs after
a determination of the legality of detention are banned if "the peti-
tion present no new ground not theretofore presented and deter-
mined, and [if] the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of
justice will not be served by such inquiry (Section 2244)." Ob-
viously this is not a rule of res judicata absolute; the court or judge
for the ends of justice may "entertain" a new application on the
old ground for the sake of justice, but entertaining it he is not
bound to grant another writ. A further and wholly new provision
is that in Section 2255 of Revised Title 28, which provides for a
motion in the trial court "to vacate, set aside, or correct the sen-
tence" by a federal court and provides that such a motion "may
be made at any time." A second or successive motion is banned.
Thus far the remedy by motion in the trial court is a criminal
remedy, it would seem, supplementing a motion for new trial or
in arrest or for correction of sentence. It is not a part of the civil
remedy by habeas corpus. It belongs logically in Revised Title 18,
United States Code (Criminal Code), or else in Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which must govern such motions except as
Section 2255 provides otherwise.6 ' The order on such a motion is
appealable (Section 2255, next to last paragraph).
But in its last paragraph Section 2255 becomes a statute for
habeas corpus; it bans "entertainment" of application for habeas
corpus by prisoner authorized to make such a motion in the trial
court, if it appears that he failed to apply for relief by such a
motion, or if such a motion was made and denied, unless "it ap-
pears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion
to the court which sentenced him," or that, if the motion was
made and denied, "it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention" (last
paragraph, Section 2255). This also does not impose res judicata
absolutely. The ban on "entertainment" of an application is not
thc same as a ban on the grant of the writ, which would imply
consideration and determination of the application. To make a
show-cause order would involve consideration of the application
by a hearing upon that order. If a show-cause order were made
it would likely "appear" by the answer to the order whether the
applicant had failed to move in the trial court when he might
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1923) ; Wong Doo v. United States,
265 U.S. 239, 240 (1923).
See FED. R. CRIN1. P., 1, 54.
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effectively have done so. It would seem logical then to conclude
that under this new law the application first made should by posi-
tive allegation assert or deny every fact that under either Section
2244 or Section 2255, last paragraph, would operate to ban "enter-
tainment" of the application. That is to say, the application should
show that it is not a second or successive one and that the right
to move in the trial court was not ignored or would have been
ineffective. If the application is a second one, that should be stated
with facts sufficient to warrant "entertainment" according to Sec-
tions 2244 and 2255. Changes in procedure here impend, and the
courts may determine their nature and extent.
EPILOGUE - CHANGES TO COME
The simile of the procedure for and upon the great writ to the
behavior of Proteus is not strained. Just as the suppliants of
Proteus had to lay firm hold on him and cling sturdily until he
ceased his apparitional antics and gave the desired information;
so must the applicant for habeas corpus make application fair and
complete on its face, and he must face all ten of the alternatives
described in Dorsey v. Gill,66 all but one of which will defeat or
prolong his application. If he evades all but that one-a grant of
the writ-he faces further trials by procedure on the writ, return,
and traverse of the return. If he has a case, is steadfast and per-
sistent, and proves it, the writ and judgment thereon will liberate
him.
This procedure is designed to protect the privilege of the writ
for those who deserve it against abuses of the privilege by those
who do not deserve it and who clamor for it incessantly. The courts
have been liberal and generous to applicants for the writ; they
will continue to be so.
The scope, reach, and objects of the great writ have stood un-
changed through three centuries, but through those centuries the
procedure has changed often. The auxiliary and processive writs
are almost superseded by more modern methods to the ends they
sought.
No one may suppose that procedural changes have ended in
habeas corpus. This is one of the epochs of procedural change,
the epoch of court-made rules of procedure to achieve simplicity,
clarity, and celerity. There will be changes. Nearly 1000 years ago
a Syrian poet wrote:
The good law and the bad laws disappear
Below the flood of custom, or they float,
And like the wonderful Sar'aby coat
They captivate us for a little year.
148 F. 2d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
' LXxVIII from The Diwan of Abu'l Ala.
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When this article was being written a bill was pending in Congress
to revise the United States Judicial Code and Judiciary law. As
the writing ended that bill became law as the new Title 28 of
United States Code. It makes changes to come.

